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FIXING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SELECTION PROCESS 
Carl Tobias

 
Federal court selection is eviscerated. Across five years in Barack Obama’s 
presidency, the judiciary confronted some eighty-five vacancies because 
Republicans never agreed to prompt Senate consideration. Only when the 
Democratic majority ignited the “nuclear option,” a rare action that permitted 
cloture with fewer than sixty votes, did gridlock end. However, openings 
quickly grew after the Grand Old Party (GOP) captured an upper chamber 
majority, notwithstanding substantial pledges that it would supply “regular 
order” again. Over 2015, the GOP cooperated little, approving the fewest 
jurists since Dwight Eisenhower was President. However, selection might 
worsen. This year is a presidential election year, a period in which 
confirmations traditionally slow to a halt, and a predicament that controversy 
regarding Justice Antonin Scalia’s High Court vacancy exacerbates. At the 
next inauguration, the bench may experience 100 unfilled circuit and trial level 
positions. These concerns demonstrate that the broken appointments system 
requires permanent improvement. 
This survey evaluates confirmations during President Obama’s tenure, 
detecting that Republicans have plumbed new depths for obstruction. Because 
this recalcitrance undermines judicial selection, the delivery of justice and 
respect for the coequal branches of government, the analysis proffers multiple 
long-term solutions, notably a bipartisan judiciary, which could enhance the 
process. 
I. JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION 
Appointments functioned comparatively well across President Obama’s 
initial six years when Democrats possessed a chamber majority. He 
assiduously consulted home state legislators, pursuing names of able, 
 
  Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond. I wish to thank Michael Gerhardt and Margaret 
Sanner for valuable suggestions, Katie Lehnen for valuable research and Leslee Stone for excellent processing 
as well as Russell Williams and the Hunton Williams Summer Endowment Fund for generous, continuing 
support. Remaining errors are mine. 
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mainstream choices, advice which the White House normally followed.
1
 Those 
efforts increased collaboration, as members grant lawmakers from states with 
vacancies deference because the politicians can stop the process through 
retaining “blue slips.” Despite persistent Administration cultivation of 
individual Republicans and Democrats, a number failed to swiftly institute 
procedures or even send picks.
2
 
The GOP collaborated in arranging Senate Judiciary Committee hearings,
3
 
yet Republicans “held over” discussions and ballots a week on virtually every 
strong, moderate nominee.
4
 The party slowly concurred in most 
recommendations’ floor debates, when needed, and chamber votes, requiring 
accomplished, mainstream nominees to languish months until Democrats 
petitioned for cloture.
5
 Republicans also demanded numerous roll call ballots 
and debate minutes on fine, centrist nominees, many of whom easily won 
approval, thus squandering rare floor time.
6
 These practices stymied 
confirmations and left courts with almost ninety openings for much of a half 
decade, which commenced in August 2009.
7
 
In the 2012 presidential election year, those strategies grew, while 
Republicans halted circuit floor votes in June.
8
 After President Obama’s 
victory, Democrats hoped for more cooperation, yet there was virtually none 
and this resistance culminated across 2013 when the White House proposed 
three excellent, moderate, diverse nominees for the D.C. Circuit, the second 
 
 1 Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2233, 2239–40 
(2013); see Sheldon Goldman, Elliott Slotnick & Sara Schiavoni, Obama’s First Term Judiciary: Picking 
Judges in the Minefield of Obstructionism, 97 JUDICATURE 7, 8–17 (2013). 
 2 Goldman et al., supra note 1, at 17; John Cornyn and Ted Cruz’s Texas: State of Judicial Emergency, 
ALLIANCE FOR JUST. (2016), http://www.afj.org/our-work/issues/judicial-selection/texas-epicenter-of-the-
judicial-vacancy-crisis; see 161 CONG. REC. S6,151 (daily ed. July 30, 2015) (statement of Sen. Schumer). 
 3 Several GOP committee members also posed numerous later written queries. Tobias, supra note 1, at 
2242; Goldman et al., supra note 1, at 21. 
 4 Republican senators deemed most nominees excellent, but the GOP allowed only one dozen of 337 to 
have votes the first time that the panel considered them. See Tobias, supra note 1, at 2242–43.  
 5 I rely in the remainder of this paragraph on Tobias, supra note 1, at 2243–46; Goldman et al., supra 
note 1, at 26–29. 
 6 See Tobias, supra note 1, at 2244; see also Juan Williams, Opinion, The GOP’s Judicial Logjam, HILL 
(July 27, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/juan-williams/249196-juan-williams-the-gops-judicial-
logjam. 
 7 Both the substantial number of vacancies and the extensive time period were unprecedented. Archive 
of Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/archive-
judicial-vacancies (last visited May 10, 2016) (including archives listing federal judicial vacancies since 1981). 
 8 Tobias, supra note 1, at 2246; Russell Wheeler, Judicial Confirmations: What Thurmond Rule?, 
45 ISSUES IN GOVERNANCE STUD., Mar. 2012, at 1, 4–5. 
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most important tribunal.
9
 The GOP refused all three candidates’ final ballots, 
and protracted obstruction eventually led Democrats to cautiously apply the 
“nuclear option,” which curtailed filibusters.
10
 
In 2015, after Republicans won a Senate majority,
11
 nominal GOP 
cooperation diminished even further. The leaders repeatedly proclaimed that 
they would duly restore the deliberative body to regular order, the scheme 
which governed before Democrats putatively undercut it. That January, Mitch 
McConnell (R–Ky.), the new Majority Leader, stated, “We need to return to 
regular order,” and he dramatically reiterated this paean over the year.
12
 Chuck 
Grassley (R–Iowa), the Senate Judiciary Chair, articulated similar concepts.
13
 
Despite many analogous promises, the GOP slowly provided suggestions for 
President Obama’s review, committee hearings with votes or floor debates and 
ballots. 
By the close of 2015, thirty-six of forty-three (eight in nine circuit) 
vacancies without nominees and twenty of twenty-two lacking them—which 
the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts classified as emergencies—
plagued states with at least one Republican senator.
14
 The chamber approved a 
lone circuit, and only ten district, prospects in 2015, while the bench 
encountered sixty-six openings.
15
 
 
 9 I rely in the remainder of this paragraph on Carl Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. 
L.J. 121 (2015); see Jeffrey Toobin, Can Merrick Garland Kill the Filibuster?, NEW YORKER (Mar. 25, 2016), 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/can-merrick-garland-kill-the-filibuster. 
 10 Detonation allowed the Senate to confirm many judges. Toobin, supra note 9. After the November 
2013 explosion, Democrats had to petition for cloture on all nominees until 2015. 161 CONG. REC. S3,223 
(daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
 11 Jerry Markon, Robert Costa & David Nakamura, Republicans Win Senate Control as Polls Show 
Dissatisfaction with Obama, WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-
control-at-stake-in-todays-midterm-elections/2014/11/04/e882353e-642c-11e4-bb14-4cfea1e742d5_story. 
html; see Jonathan Weisman & Ashley Parker, G.O.P. Takes Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at A1. 
 12 161 CONG. REC. S27–28 (daily ed. Jan. 7, 2015); id. at S2,767 (daily ed. May 12, 2015). But see id. at 
S2,949 (daily ed. May 18, 2015) (statement of Sen. Reid); id. at S3,223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of 
Sen. Leahy). 
 13 Grassley pledged that the committee would follow regular order in analyzing nominees. Hearing on 
Judicial Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (Jan. 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. 
Chuck Grassley); David Catanese, Chuck Grassley’s Gavel Year, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Jan. 28, 2015), 
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/01/28/chuck-grassleys-gavel-year. But see 161 CONG. REC. S6,151 
(daily ed. July 30, 2015) (statement of Sen. Schumer); Jason Noble, Grassley Leads Slowdown of Judicial 
Confirmations, DES MOINES REG. (Apr. 1, 2016, 12:01 PM), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/ 
politics/2016/03/30/grassley-leads-slowdown-judicial-confirmations/82440284/. 
 14 Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 7. The federal court administrative arm premises 
emergencies on dockets’ large size and vacancies’ prolonged length.  
 15 Id. 
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The process began slowly in 2016, which comprises a presidential election 
year when approvals customarily stall and ultimately halt, a circumstance 
worsened by Republican denial of any procedures to President Obama’s 
Supreme Court nominee.
16
 The panel accorded one trial court submission a 
hearing before April 20, 2016,
17
 and has continued holding over two district 
aspirants for months without providing a reason.
18
 Five nominees won 
confirmation before President’s Day,
19
 although under regular order, they 
deserved votes in 2015. It remains unclear how long the GOP will employ its 
failure to consider D.C. Circuit Chief Judge Merrick Garland as one critical 
excuse for also declining scrutiny of lower court possibilities. 
II. THE REASONS FOR AND IMPLICATIONS OF PROBLEMATIC JUDICIAL 
SELECTION 
The reasons for selection difficulties are not clear,
20
 but observers ascribe 
the modern “confirmation wars” to Judge Robert Bork’s 1987 attempted 
Supreme Court appointment.
21
 They discern that the process is broken and 
marked by rampant partisanship, systematic paybacks, and divisive 
gamesmanship, whereby the parties keep ratcheting down the scheme.
22
 The 
 
 16 Theodore B. Olson, Opinion, A Supreme Court Challenge for Democrats, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2016), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/a-supreme-court-challenge-for-democrats-1461885048; Michael D. Shear, Julie 
Hirschfield Davis & Gardiner Harris, Obama Pick Engages Supreme Court Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2016, 
at A1; Russell Wheeler, With Senate Control, Will the GOP Stop Confirming Circuit Court Judges? 
BROOKINGS: FIXGOV (June 10, 2015, 8:00 PM), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2015/06/10-
circuit-court-confirmations-wheeler. 
 17 Hearings on Judicial Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (Jan. 27, 2016); 
id. (Apr. 20, 2016). 
 18 Nominees Robert Colville and John Younge had their Pennsylvania senators’ support and a 2015 
hearing. Hearings on Judicial Nominations Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (Dec. 9, 2015).  
 19 Confirmation Listing, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/ 
confirmation-listing (last updated May 7, 2016); Agreement on Restrepo Nomination, U.S. SENATE 
DEMOCRATS (Dec. 9, 2015, 5:15 PM); see 162 CONG. REC. S1,848 (daily ed. Apr. 11, 2016); id. at S2,812 
(daily ed. May 16, 2016) (confirming two district judges since the President’s Day Recess). 
 20 Numerous observers, particularly scholars and federal lawmakers, robustly debate whether 
appointments have always been complicated. Michael J. Gerhardt & Michael Ashley Stein, The Politics of 
Early Justice: Federal Judicial Selection, 1789–1861, 100 IOWA L. REV. 551 (2015); Orrin G. Hatch, The 
Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1035 (2009). 
 21 ETHAN BRONNER, BATTLE FOR JUSTICE: HOW THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK AMERICA (1989); 
MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S REJECTION OF ROBERT 
BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME COURT (1992); Olson, supra note 16. 
 22 The latest battle commenced with claims that Democrats had stalled President Bush’s last years and 
Republican retaliation with unprecedented delay in President Obama’s time. Democrats then used the nuclear 
option to approve many judges in 2014’s lame duck session to which the GOP responded by drastically 
slowing picks since 2015. See supra notes 1–19 and accompanying text. 
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effects are grave. Prolonged inaction means that the bench has eighty lower 
court, and thirty emergency, vacancies, a number Republicans permitted to 
increase since the party won the chamber.
23
 Only after Democrats used the 
nuclear option to restrict filibusters did the judiciary experience forty vacancies 
at 2014’s conclusion; however, since the GOP captured a Senate majority, the 
number has increased to eighty openings.
24
 
Lengthy confirmations have detrimental impacts.
25
 They require able, 
mainstream nominees to place careers on hold, stop myriad fine people from 
envisioning bench service, 
26
 and deprive tribunals of crucial judicial 
resources, which all courts need to discharge their constitutional 
responsibilities, while depriving parties of the justice that courts deliver.
27
 
These phenomena also undermine citizens’ regard for the selection procedures 
and the coordinate government branches.
28
 In sum, those problems show the 
profound need for long-term solutions. 
III. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
Manifold elements demonstrate that 2016 is past time for seriously 
examining remedies that would permanently improve the atrophied selection 
process: the fewest confirmations last year since 1960;
29
 over eighty vacancies’ 
 
 23 Emergency vacancies skyrocketed from twelve in 2015 to as many as thirty-four subsequently. 
Judicial Vacancies, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies (last updated 
May 7, 2016); see 161 CONG. REC. S3,223 (daily ed. May 21, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy); see Joe 
Palazzolo, In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/in-federal-courts-civil-cases-pile-up-1428343746. 
 24 Recent Senate inaction could well yield 100 openings and 50 emergencies during 2017. See sources 
cited supra note 16. 
 25 160 CONG. REC. S5,364 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2014) (statement of Sen. Leahy); Tobias, supra note 1, at 
2253.  
 26 See Andrew Cohen, In Pennsylvania, the Human Costs of Judicial Confirmation Delays, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 9, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/09/in-pennsylvania-the-human-costs-of-
judicial-confirmation-delays/261862/; Todd Ruger, Nominees Are Living on Hold; Caught in a Political 
Game, Judicial Candidates Get Used to Waiting, NAT’L L.J. (Dec. 17, 2012), 
http://www.nationallawjournal.com/id=1202581557603/Nominees-are-living-on-hold; see also Tobias, supra 
note 1, at 2253. 
 27 JOHN ROBERTS, 2010 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 7–8 (2010); Tobias, supra note 
1, at 2253; Jennifer Bendery, Federal Judges Are Burned Out, Overworked and Wondering Where Congress 
Is, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 30, 2015, 2:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/judge-federal-courts-
vacancies_us_55d77721e4b0a40aa3aaf14b. 
 28 See sources cited supra notes 23, 25–27. 
 29 Particularly ironic about 2015 was the Senate failure to even match approvals in several recent 
presidential election years. See Carl Tobias, Filling Judicial Vacancies in a Presidential Election Year, 46 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 985, 996 (2012). 
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persistence throughout an unprecedented half decade; the regime’s downward 
spiral manifested by counterproductive paybacks and striking politicization, 
culminating with GOP refusal to assess President Obama’s Supreme Court 
nominee; and the dismal prospects for rectifying the conundrum. However, 
2016 is also a promising season for developing cogent long-term reform. As a 
presidential election year, when numerous Democrats and Republicans will be 
unsure who could ultimately triumph and capitalize on the modifications but 
wish to appear confident that their nominees might win, 2016 supplies 
uncertainties and opportunities for compromise. Therefore, both parties should 
favor permanent solutions, while President Obama and legislators need to 
respect constitutional appointments duties with meaningful cooperation that 
prescribes these remedies.
30
 
President Obama and senators can agree on dramatically changing the 
present system through inauguration of a bipartisan judiciary that would enable 
the party without administration control to suggest a percentage of aspirants.
31
 
Lawmakers from certain states have instituted relatively analogous concepts 
over various periods. New York senators effectuated the first initiative that 
allowed the official whose party lacked the executive to forward one in several 
district choices, and this measure operated efficaciously from the 1970s until 
the 1990s.
32
 Pennsylvania is a modern example. Senators Robert Casey (D–
Pa.) and Patrick Toomey (R–Pa.) now depend on merit-selection commissions, 
which have vetted and recommended persons since 2011,
33
 while the legislator 
whose party does not occupy the White House might send one in four trial 
court nominees.
34
 
 
 30 For numerous short-term and permanent measures that would address the confirmation wars, see 
Michael L. Shenkman, Decoupling District from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial Bench 
Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 298–311 (2012); Tobias, supra note 1, at 2255–65. 
 31 Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 688 (2003); Carl W. 
Tobias, Postpartisan Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REV. 769, 790 (2010). 
 32 It was initially one in four and most recently one in three under Senators Alphonse D’Amato (R–N.Y.) 
and Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D–N.Y.). 143 CONG. REC. S2,538 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1997) (statement of Sen. 
Biden). See generally Stephan O. Kline, The Topsy-Turvy World of Judicial Confirmations in the Era of Hatch 
and Lott, 103 DICK. L. REV. 247, 249 (1999).  
 33 See President Obama Nominates Four PA Judges to Fill Federal Court Vacancies, PENNSYLVANIANS 
FOR MODERN CTS. (July 20, 2015), http://pmconline.org/node/12. 
 34 Id. Illinois senators use a similar system. Press Release, Sen. Dick Durbin, White House Nominates 
Two to Fill Federal Judicial Vacancies in Northern District (Aug. 5, 2014), http://www.durbin.senate.gov/ 
newsroom/press-releases/durbin-white-house-nominates-two-to-fill-federal-judicial-vacancies-in-northern-
district. 
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Varying rules pertain within the jurisdictions and would essentially 
comprise matters for negotiation among chamber members and between the 
senators and the President.
35
 Central should be the percentages of submissions 
the opposition party affords, the number it could marshal for every opening, 
and whether designees need to be ranked.
36
 For split delegations, the issues are 
whether the opposition politician from the state or the President will identify 
favorites or exercise vetoes and how to carefully resolve disagreement between 
this officer and the President. Salutary treatment would have that lawmaker 
proffer one candidate at a time until the White House concurs, as this solution 
respects constitutional phrasing and contemporary practice.
37
 
Another matter is which tribunals should be eligible. For instance, 
particular tribunals, notably the D.C. District Court, may require exclusion, as 
the District of Columbia lacks senators and the Executive Branch 
conventionally spearheads the nomination process.
38
 Because appellate 
vacancies occur less frequently while the regional circuits include multiple 
states, the bipartisan judiciary will apply best to courts with numerous jurists.
39
 
Those operational elements and perceptions that seating these judges is 
political, complex and compelling, as circuit opinions supposedly enunciate 
policy and govern more states, indicate tribunal exclusion would be preferable. 
Congress should package this device with a bill which authorizes seventy-
three judgeships.
40
 That would implement the 2015 Judicial Conference 
recommendations, which the federal courts’ policymaking arm derived from 
conservative estimates of work and case loads that will accord courts resources 
 
 35 See sources cited supra note 31. But see Confirmation Hearings on Federal Appointments: Hearing 
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, Part 1, 105th Cong. 6 (1997) (statement of Sen. Biden); sources cited 
supra note 32. 
 36 The procedures which senators presently employ in their jurisdictions suggest that opposition senators 
can pick one in three or four. Employing 2016, in states with two GOP senators, they choose, and in 
jurisdictions with two Democrats, the senior GOP official picks. All senators then must work with the 
President.  
 37 See infra note 44. The lawmaker also might wish to supply multiple prospects and rank preferences, 
which can increase flexibility and expedite selection by obviating the need to start over when the President and 
senator differ.  
 38 Those courts with a bipartisan judiciary could be matters for negotiation or be left to the opposition 
party. Small districts may warrant exclusion, as they rarely experience vacancies. 
 39 Even in the Ninth Circuit, which is the largest appeals court, openings arise once in a generation for 
Alaska, Hawaii and Montana.  
 40 Tobias, supra note 9, at 140. If the selection process continues to spiral downward, additional 
judgeships will not improve selection or the judicial vacancy crisis. 
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needed for delivering justice.
41
 Those ideas must become effective over 2017, 
thereby advantaging neither party when first secured and preventing them from 
gaming the regime.
42
 
Combining a bipartisan judiciary and seventy-three posts could yield many 
benefits. It would halt or slow the process’s slide while affording each party 
incentives to collaborate, jurists who are comparatively diverse vis-à-vis 
experience, ideology, ethnicity, gender and sexual orientation and the bench 
resources. The concept’s passage this year and institution over 2017 will 
concomitantly stop both parties from exacting unfair advantage. Nevertheless, 
implementation warrants some caution. For example, Vice President Joe 
Biden, as a senator from Delaware, vigorously criticized a related mechanism 
because it was not traditional, and the Constitution states that the President 
must nominate and confirm jurists with Senate advice and consent.
43
 However, 
Biden’s proposition applies equally to the unprecedented gridlock witnessed 
since 2009, while a bipartisan judiciary can be devised that honors the revered 
document.
44
 Instituting this approach could appear complicated, yet any 
problems can be easily solved.
45
 
Another long-term prospect is recalibrating the filibuster which has been 
essential to the modern confirmation wars. The notion traditionally 
safeguarded the minority party, although overuse shows that this now deserves 
reformulation by confining application.
46
 For instance, deployment must 
effectively be restricted to nominees who lack the intelligence, diligence, 
 
 41 JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S. 18 
(2015); see S. 1,385, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing the most recent comprehensive judgeships legislation). 
 42 When the parties reach agreement before the elections, this makes it considerably more difficult for 
either to game the system. 
 43 Biden was addressing “trades” between senators and the President, which Republicans proposed 
during President Bill Clinton’s Administration. Georgia senators and President Obama seemed to employ 
trades when they could not reach agreement on nominees for many Georgia vacancies. Dan Malloy, The 
Delegation of Georgians in D.C., ATLANTA J. CONST., July 20, 2014, at 14A; see sources cited supra note 32. 
 44 The Constitution does not proscribe bipartisan courts. President Obama and Congress can agree to the 
ideas proposed above. A bipartisan judiciary may further politicize selection or deny political victors spoils. 
However, the measure could improve selection, the confirmation wars’ continuation and expansion are 
unacceptable and judicial and litigant needs should be paramount.  
 45 Congress has addressed issues equally complex as the confirmation wars, namely the judiciary’s 
efforts to resolve substantial and increasingly complex litigation with scarce resources, by passing legislation 
that authorizes many new circuit and district judgeships. Nonetheless, Congress passed the last comprehensive 
judgeships legislation in 1990. See Federal Judgeship Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 201–206, 104 Stat. 
5089–104. Moreover, the ideas described earlier address numerous problems which establishment of a 
bipartisan judiciary might appear to create. 
 46 Filibuster overuse provoked the 2013 nuclear option’s controversial detonation. See sources cited 
supra notes 9–10.  
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temperament, ethics, or independence for providing exceptional judicial 
service. That purpose would be realized through employing filibusters only in 
“extraordinary circumstances,” a system which performed smoothly across 
2005, while comprehensively and clearly defining this precept.
47
 Lawmakers 
argued that candidate ideological views and the magnitude of a court’s filings 
and judicial complement were not actually extraordinary circumstances in 
resolving the dispute about filling three D.C. Circuit vacancies.
48
 These 
alterations might foster reinstatement of sixty votes for cloture, a determination 
that would plainly reverse the nuclear option and supposedly promote 
cooperation.
49
 
CONCLUSION 
Federal judicial appointments have spiraled downward for too many years, 
a crisis which undercuts justice. Thus, President Obama and senators need to 
capitalize on the opportunity that the 2016 presidential election year affords by 
fashioning salient permanent remedies for the selection conundrum. 
 
 
 47 See Text of Senate Compromise on Nominations of Judges, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2005), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/24/politics/24text.html; see also Michael Gerhardt & Richard Painter, 
“Extraordinary Circumstances”: The Legacy of the Gang of 14 and a Proposal for Judicial Nominations 
Reform, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 969 (2012); Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 
303 (2011); Dahlia Lithwick, Extraordinary Hypocrisy, SLATE (May 19, 2011, 7:17 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/05/extraordinary_hypocrisy.html.  
 48 Tobias, supra note 9, at 126–28. But see id. at 125–27.  
 49 Reinstatement of the sixty-vote rule for cloture also may enhance filibuster deployment, prompting 
more petitions for cloture and floor votes. Id. at 140. An effective custom employed in President George 
Bush’s last two years was floor votes on all strong, centrist district nominees immediately before lengthy 
recesses. 161 CONG. REC. S2,029 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 2015) (statement of Sen. Leahy). The Senate could apply 
many other conventions as well that would reinstitute regular order.  
